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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) delivered only six precedential trademark
1
opinions in 2005. It also issued six non-precedential trademark

*
Stephen R. Baird is a shareholder of Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., a
Minneapolis-based general practice law firm. He is head of Winthrop & Weinstine’s
Intellectual Property and Trademark and Brand Management Practice Groups. The
author would like to thank Samuel Lockner and Kyle Kaiser, Winthrop & Weinstine
associates, and Brent Lorentz, a Winthrop & Weinstine summer associate, for their
capable assistance and dedication in preparing this Article. The author, a 1990-91
law clerk to The Honorable Wilson Cowen, dedicates this work to distinguished
inactive Senior Judge Wilson Cowen of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005); SKF USA, Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire
Fashions, Inc., 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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opinions during the year. The Federal Circuit’s dozen trademark
cases for 2005 came from three different sources: the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”), the International
Trade Commission (“ITC”), and two federal district courts. The
Federal Circuit appears to have been in a fairly affirming mood of
both the TTAB and ITC during 2005, siding with the ITC in the one
3
4
case it reviewed, siding with the TTAB in six of its nine decisions,
5
6
affirming in part two TTAB decisions, and vacating only one. In
contrast, the Federal Circuit disturbed both of the trademark
7
decisions coming from federal district courts in 2005. Of the many
interesting substantive and procedural trademark issues confronted
by the court during 2005, only one was identified as an issue of first
8
impression.
I.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT TRADEMARK CASES
A. Res Judicata/Issue Preclusion

In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued only one precedential opinion
concerning procedural issues in a trademark case. In Mayer/Berkshire
9
Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., the court reviewed a summary
judgment decision of the TTAB that dismissed an opposition brought
by Mayer/Berkshire to prevent registration of the trademark
BERKSHIRE in International Class 25 for various categories of
10
clothing made by Berkshire Fashions.
Circuit Judge Pauline
2. Stoller v. N. Telepresence Corp., 152 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Hartco
Eng’g, Inc. v. Wang’s Int’l, Inc., 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Stoller v.
Hyperstealth Biotech. Corp., 131 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Precision Cuts,
Inc., 131 F. App’x 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Decorations for Generations, Inc. v. Home
Depot USA, Inc., 128 F. App’x 133 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Innovation Dev. Group, 126
F. App’x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1318.
4. In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d at 1043; N. Telepresence Corp., 152 F. App’x at
927; In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1214; In re Precision Cuts, Inc., 131 F. App’x at 291;
Hyperstealth Biotech., 131 F. App’x at 283; In re Innovation Dev. Group, 126 F. App’x at
474.
5. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301; Palm Bay Imps., Inc., 396 F.3d at
1377.
6. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1234.
7. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at 461; Decorations for Generations, Inc., 128 F. App’x at
139.
8. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1312.
9. 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
10. Berkshire Fashions sought to register the trademark BERKSHIRE for the
following goods in Int’l Class 25: raincoats, sweaters, pocket squares, scarves,
mantillas, belts, gloves, hats, earmuffs, slippers, tops, blouses, shirts, pants, vests, and
uniforms. Id. at 1230-31. Mayer/Berkshire claimed use of the BERKSHIRE mark
since 1906 as a trade name and since 1925 as a trademark for the following goods:
gloves, lingerie, nightgowns, pajamas, t-shirts, leotards, and down vests. Id. at 1230.
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Newman, writing for a unanimous three-member panel of the
Federal Circuit, held that the Board erred in its application of the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, vacated the TTAB’s
grant of summary judgment, and remanded the opposition for
11
further proceedings.
Defendant Berkshire Fashions had obtained summary judgment
because the Board found that prior federal district court litigation
between the parties had already decided there was no likelihood of
12
confusion between the respective BERKSHIRE marks of the
13
parties. The prior federal district court litigation was brought by
Mayer/Berkshire, claiming trademark infringement and unfair
14
competition by Berkshire Fashions. At trial, the jury answered “no”
to the following question: “Have defendants infringed plaintiff’s
trademark, i.e., is there a likelihood of confusion resulting from the
15
use by defendants of the trademark and trade name ‘Berkshire’?”
Given the jury verdict, the district court entered judgment for the
defendant. This judgment also caused the TTAB to dismiss a
previous opposition filed by Mayer/Berkshire against Berkshire
Fashions’ application to register BERKSHIRE as a trademark for
certain goods falling within International Class 18, namely,

Since 1990, Mayer/Berkshire has owned eight registrations for BERKSHIRE in
connection with different items of apparel and hosiery in Int’l Class 25. Id.
11. Id.
12. The “likelihood of confusion” analysis is the touchstone judicial standard in
trademark law and is based on section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(2000). See, e.g., Edwin S. Clark, Finding Likelihood of Confusion With Actual Confusion:
A Critical Analysis of the Federal Courts’ Approach, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393, 393
(1992) (“Likelihood of confusion is the cornerstone of trademark infringement.”);
H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting Rights and Remedies
Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301, 313-14 (2005) (“One of the most troublesome
factors for trademark holders tends to be similarity of the goods and competitive
proximity.”). Courts typically consider several factors to determine whether
competing products reach the “likelihood of confusion” threshold. See, e.g., Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (analyzing
(1) strength of the trademark, (2) similarity of the marks, (3) proximity of the
products and their competitiveness with one another, (4) evidence that the senior
user may “bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the market of the
alleged infringer’s product, (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion, (6) evidence
that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith, (7) respective quality of the
products, and (8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant market); see also AMF
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing non-exclusive
factors to consider “in determining whether confusion between related goods is
likely”). For a general discussion of the likelihood of confusion analysis in trademark
law, see Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004), and
Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit’s Standard of
Review, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (1991).
13. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1231.
14. Id. at 1230.
15. Id. at 1231.
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umbrellas, tote bags, and umbrella and scarf sets. The question
posed to the Federal Circuit was whether Mayer/Berkshire’s attempt
to prevent Berkshire Fashions from registering BERKSHIRE for
clothing items falling within International Class 25 was precluded by
17
the prior federal district court litigation.
18
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing controlling
19
and non-controlling
precedent concerning the re-litigation
avoidance doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
recognized that the “likelihood of confusion” issue decided by a
federal district court as part of a trademark infringement analysis only
20
“presents a ‘superficial similarity’” and will not always control the
outcome of a likelihood of confusion determination concerning the
21
question of trademark registration before the TTAB. According to the
court, the issue at litigation addressed whether Berkshire Fashions
displayed the BERKSHIRE mark or the Berkshire Fashions trade
name on certain products in such a way as to likely cause confusion
22
with Mayer/Berkshire’s registered BERKSHIRE trademarks.
In
contrast, the court noted that a trademark opposition proceeding
“requires consideration not only of what the applicant has already
marketed or has stated the intention to market, but of all the items
23
for which registration is sought.” Because there was a reasonable
dispute as to whether Berkshire Fashions’ trademark application
“embraces a broader statement of goods than those before the
24
district court,” summary judgment was inappropriate. Indeed, the
court criticized the Board for loosely referring to “garments” in

16. Id.
17. Id. at 1231-32.
18. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)
(distinguishing the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel); Jet, Inc. v.
Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining the basis of
res jucicata, or “claim preclusion”).
19. Am. Hygenic Labs., Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 855, 856-57
(T.T.A.B. 1986) (
[I]f res judicata applies at all, it must rest on the principle of claim
preclusion, that is, that opposer’s claim of priority and likelihood of
confusion in the opposition is precluded because that claim has been
determined by virtue of the disposition of the civil action . . . . We do not
believe that claim preclusion applies in this case.
); see also In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1214, 1218
(T.T.A.B. 2001) (addressing whether an infringement action regarding the call
letters of two broadcast stations is licensed in a trademark sense, while leaving the
door open for future FCC discretion if a similar issue arises).
20. Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Jet, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1364-65).
21. Id. at 1232-33.
22. Id. at 1233.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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describing what was at issue in the prior district court judgment and
the current Berkshire Fashions’ trademark application, holding that
25
“[p]recedent and practice require a more detailed analysis.”
Because the Board failed to analyze and compare each separate item
of clothing, the court determined the Board had “not establish[ed]
preclusion as to the specific items for which registration is sought and
26
opposed.”
In vacating and remanding the Board’s decision to grant summary
judgment, the Federal Circuit was also persuaded that
Mayer/Berkshire had presented sufficient evidence of actual
confusion resulting from allegedly changed marketing practices of
27
Berkshire Fashions following the favorable district court judgment.
Mayer/Berkshire sought to show that Berkshire Fashions went from
“inconspicuous marking of some goods with labels bearing only the
trade name” to “major marketing activity promoting the trademark
BERKSHIRE in a manner” that has caused “significant actual
28
confusion.”
In conclusion, the court cited authority for the
proposition that preclusion is a “drastic remedy,” warning that
“[c]aution is warranted in the application of preclusion by the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), for the purposes of administrative
trademark procedures include protecting both the consuming public
29
and the purveyors.” Because the court was not satisfied that the
Board had found preclusion “certain to every intent” and because
“[t]he question of the likelihood of confusion presented sufficiently
different issues and transactional facts to bar the application of
30
preclusion,” summary judgment was inappropriate.
B. Rules Concerning Extension of Time to Oppose
In 2005, the Federal Circuit also had occasion to hear two TTAB
appeals involving trademark procedural issues, filed by the infamous
Leo Stoller, who has been identified by some commentators as a
31
“trademark troll.” Mr. Stoller lost both appeals in non-precedential
opinions.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1234.
27. Id. at 1233.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1234.
30. Id.
31. See The Troll Who Stole Super Sunday, Post of Marty Schwimmer to The
Trademark Blog (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.schwimmerlegal.com/archives/2006/02
/the_troll_who_s.html. John L. Welch, author of the award-winning TTABlog:
Keeping Tabs on the TTAB posted an article on January 26, 2006, entitled It’s Time to
Tackle the ‘Trademark Trolls’. Welch’s TTABlog closely follows the actions of Mr. Leo
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In Stoller v. Hyperstealth Biotechnology Corp., Circuit Judge Pauline
Newman, writing for a three-member panel of the Federal Circuit,
affirmed the TTAB’s decision refusing to remand a multi-class
trademark registration application that Mr. Stoller apparently wanted
33
to oppose. Hyperstealth had filed an application to register the
mark HYPERSTEALTH with respect to two different classes of goods,
International Class 5 (covering, inter alia, pharmaceuticals) and
34
International Class 10 (covering, inter alia, medical devices).
35
Following Hyperstealth’s publication in the Official Gazette, Mr.
Stoller filed an opposition as to the Class 5 goods based on exclusive
36
rights he claims in his alleged trademark STEALTH. Upon learning
of the opposition, and undoubtedly looking to avoid a dispute with
Mr. Stoller, Hyperstealth abandoned the registration application with
respect to Class 5 goods, and the application was then approved with
37
respect to the Class 10 goods.
Apparently wanting to oppose the HYPERSTEALTH mark with
respect to the Class 10 goods as well, but having failed to do so with
his original opposition, Mr. Stoller attempted to create new law in his
38
arguments for reconsideration. First, he claimed that res judicata
made his successful opposition for the Class 5 goods applicable to the
39
Class 10 goods as well. The court easily disposed of this argument by
noting that the likelihood of confusion analysis would be completely
40
different with respect to different classes of goods. Second, Mr.
41
The court
Stoller argued that collateral estoppel should apply.
easily disposed of this argument as well. Because the filing of an
opposition followed by the voluntary abandonment of an application
did not constitute actual litigation before the TTAB, collateral
42
estoppel could not apply. In addition to the well-established legal
precedent opposing Mr. Stoller’s arguments, practical realities
further necessitated the TTAB’s decision because, had Mr. Stoller’s
Stoller and his related companies. Apparently Mr. Stoller and his various entities
have filed several hundred requests for extension of time to oppose registration of a
wide variety of marks during the last couple of months in 2005 and in January 2006.
Posting of John L. Welch to the TTABlog, http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2006/01
/ttablog-update-on-leo-stoller-and.html (Jan. 26, 2006).
32. 131 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-precedential).
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 281-82.
38. Id. at 282.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 282-83.
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arguments succeeded, it would have permitted an opposer to
disregard the clear rules requiring the payment of a separate filing
43
fee for each class of goods or services being opposed.
44
In Stoller v. Northern Telepresence Corp., the Federal Circuit, in a per
curiam opinion, affirmed the TTAB’s decision denying as untimely
Mr. Stoller’s request for extension of time to oppose registration of
45
the trademark DARKSTAR filed by Northern Telepresence.
Mr.
Stoller made three separate attempts to extend the time to oppose
registration of the DARKSTAR mark, and each failed. In his first
46
attempt, the unsigned request for extension of time to oppose
arrived at the PTO several days after expiration of the thirty-day
47
In addition, the certificate of mailing
opposition period.
accompanying the request, dated prior to the expiration of the
48
49
opposition period, also was not signed by Mr. Stoller. Had both
the request and the certificate been signed, the court presumed the
filing would have been considered timely, since they were dated prior
50
to expiration of the opposition period. Since the facts showed that
both were unsigned, the court agreed with the TTAB that this first
51
extension attempt was defective.
Mr. Stoller’s second extension attempt responded to the TTAB’s
invitation to cure the defect in the first request pursuant to a rule of
practice in trademark cases that, in the court’s words, prohibits the
Board from refusing to consider “an unsigned paper . . . if a signed
copy is submitted to the Board within the time limit set forth in the
52
Board’s notification of the signature defect.” This second attempt
contained a copy of Mr. Stoller’s first extension request, and while he
did sign the second request, he did not date it, and while he signed

43. See Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Filing an Opposition, 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.101(d)(1) (2005) (“The opposition must be accompanied by the required fee for
each party joined as opposer for each class in the application for which registration is
opposed . . . .”).
44. 152 F.App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (non-precedential).
45. Id. at 924.
46. 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) requires that extensions of time to oppose must be
signed. Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Extension of Time for Filing an
Opposition, 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) (2005).
47. N. Telepresence, 152 F. App’x at 925.
48. 37 C.F.R. § 2.197 requires that certificates of mailing be signed. Rules of
Practice in Trademark Cases, Certificate of Mailing or Transmission, 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.197 (2005).
49. N. Telepresence, 152 F. App’x at 925.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, Service and Signing of
Papers, 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e) (2005)).
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the certificate of mailing, it was dated well outside the thirty-day limit,
53
rendering the second request defective as well.
The Federal Circuit described Mr. Stoller’s third request as a
“copy” of the original first request, but unlike the first request, he
both signed and dated this third request within the original thirty-day
54
statutory period.
The TTAB held that the record contained no
evidence that this fully signed and timely dated extension request had
55
been received by the Board or timely mailed to the Board.
Alternatively, the Board held that Mr. Stoller failed to prove that he
had actually signed the first request within the original thirty-day
56
statutory period, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e).
After
reviewing the Board’s full record, the court concluded that the third
request was not faxed to the Board by Mr. Stoller until almost one
57
year after the original unsigned request was filed. Because the court
agreed that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s
finding that Mr. Stoller failed to make a timely request for extension
of time to oppose registration of the DARKSTAR mark, it affirmed
58
the Board’s decision.
In doing so, however, the Federal Circuit
explicitly left open the question whether the Board had correctly
interpreted 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(e) as requiring that the “signed copy”
59
be signed within the original thirty-day statutory period.
II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion
In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued only one precedential opinion
interpreting the “likelihood of confusion” standard set forth in
60
section 2(d) of the Lanham Act. In Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve
61
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, Palm Bay appealed a
decision of the TTAB refusing registration of the mark VEUVE
62
The refusal was based on likely
ROYALE for sparkling wine.
confusion with the marks VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN, VEUVE

53. Id.
54. Id. at 926.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 927.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text
(discussing the likelihood of confusion standard).
61. 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 1370.
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63

CLICQUOT, and THE WIDOW. Specifically, Palm Bay asserted that
the Board had made erroneous findings with respect to four of the
64
(1) the
factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.:
similarity of the marks, (2) third-party use of the term VEUVE,
(3) the fame of appellee Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
65
En 1772 (“VCP”)’s marks, and (4) purchaser sophistication. First,
Palm Bay took issue with the Board’s finding that the marks were
similar, arguing that the Board had improperly stated and applied
66
the similarity test. The test for similarity or dissimilarity requires an
examination of the appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression of the marks; however, the Board had carelessly treated
67
“commercial impression” as the ultimate conclusion to be reached.
Noting that “commercial impression” had occasionally been used as a
proxy for the ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of
marks, the court decided that such a minor misstatement of the test
68
in an otherwise proper analysis would not create reversible error.
Also, Palm Bay unsuccessfully argued that the Board did not give
69
sufficient weight to the dominance of CLICQUOT in VCP’s marks.
The court found that VEUVE was clearly a distinctive term as applied
to wines, and thus was conceptually strong as a trademark; the
70
accompanying use of CLICQUOT did not diminish that fact.
Furthermore, since VEUVE was the dominant feature of Palm Bay’s
mark (as opposed to the laudatory ROYALE), it was proper to
conclude that the use of the same distinctive term at the beginning of
71
the marks rendered them similar. Thus, the Court affirmed the
72
Board’s finding that the marks were more similar than dissimilar.
Second, Palm Bay claimed that the Board erred when it rejected
evidence of third-party usage of VEUVE on other alcoholic
73
beverages.
Again, the court affirmed the Board’s decision.
Although such evidence could sometimes be used to show that a
similar mark was relatively weak and entitled to narrow protection,
63. Id. at 1371.
64. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In In re DuPont, the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ruled that an inquiry into the likelihood of consumer
confusion was a question of fact and articulated thirteen factors that should be
weighed when evaluating the likelihood of confusion.
65. Palm Bay Imps., Inc., 396 F.3d at 1371.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1371-72.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1372.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1372-73.
72. Id. at 1373.
73. Id.
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such evidence was only relevant if the consuming public was exposed
74
to the mark. Here, the only evidence offered was a Beverage Media
Guide circulated to distributors and the testimony of a private
investigator who found Veuve de Varnay for sale in six New York
75
stores and on Internet Web sites and restaurant lists. The court
found that the Media Guide was irrelevant because it provided no
indication that the consuming public was aware of the third party76
usage. Also, the court concluded that the remaining evidence could
not possibly demonstrate that third-party usage was sufficiently
widespread to “condition” the consuming public to associate VEUVE
77
with alcoholic beverages in general. Thus, the evidence of thirdparty usage was not significant enough to undermine the strength of
VCP’s mark and the Board’s rejection of the evidence was deemed
78
proper.
Third, the court addressed the issue of fame and explicitly stated
that fame for likelihood of confusion purposes differs from fame for
79
dilution purposes. Under a dilution analysis, fame is an either-or
proposition; however, under a likelihood of confusion analysis, fame
exists along a spectrum entitling parties to corresponding degrees of
80
protection. The court then determined that fame for the likelihood
of confusion analysis should be based upon the specific product
81
market. Thus, in order for a mark to be famous such that it is
entitled to greater protection, it need only be known within the
82
segment of the population likely to use the product. Specifically,
the court stated that “fame of a mark under the fifth DuPont factor is
the class of customers and potential customers of a product or
83
service, and not the general public.” The court then found that
substantial sales volume and advertising expenditures were adequate
84
to support the finding regarding the fame of the mark.
Finally, the court addressed the purchaser sophistication. The
relevant inquiry under this factor was “the conditions under which,
85
and to whom, sales are made.” If the consumers are sophisticated

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375-76.
Id. at 1376.
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and the item is not subject to impulse purchases, more similarity
86
between the marks can be tolerated. In this case, the Board found
that champagne and sparkling wines were not necessarily expensive
87
goods that were always purchased by sophisticated individuals.
Many brands of champagne and sparkling wine sell for less than ten
dollars per bottle and general consumers, not just connoisseurs,
88
constitute the purchasing public.
Thus, the Board had properly
89
applied the “purchaser sophistication” factor.
Ancillary to the preceding analysis, the court discussed the doctrine
90
of foreign equivalents because the Board had found Palm Bay’s
mark to be similar to THE WIDOW. (VEUVE ROYALE translates
from French to English as “Royal Widow”). The court noted that the
doctrine of foreign equivalents should be applied only when the
average American purchaser would “stop and translate the word into
91
its English equivalent.” Since the court was unconvinced that the
average American purchaser would translate “VEUVE” to “widow,”
substantial evidence did not support the Board’s finding on
likelihood of confusion for THE WIDOW.
B. Disclaimers
92

In In re Stereotaxis, Inc., the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s
finding of mere descriptiveness and affirmed the TTAB’s decision to
condition registration of the trademark STEREOTAXIS and Design
for medical goods and services on the applicant disclaiming the word
93
STEREOTAXIS. The applicant sought to register the mark shown
below in connection with twelve goods and services, including
“Magnetic Navigation Systems for Medical Applications,” “Magnetic
Medical Devices,” “Magnets and Electromagnets for Medical
94
Applications,” and “Medical Imaging Apparatus.”

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1377 (explaining that the doctrine of foreign equivalents refers to the
practice of translating foreign words from common languages “into English to
determine genericness, descriptiveness, as well as similarity of connotation in order
to ascertain confusing similarity to English word marks”).
91. Id. (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 109 (T.T.A.B. 1976)).
92. 429 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 1040.
94. Id.
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The Examining Attorney of the PTO concluded that the term
STEREOTAXIS was merely descriptive and had to be disclaimed
before applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark could be
95
registered. The applicant appealed the disclaimer requirement to
96
the TTAB, and the TTAB affirmed. Specifically, the TTAB ruled
that “the term stereotaxis immediately describes . . . significant
information concerning the nature, purpose or function of at least
some, if not most, of the applicant’s goods, and therefore must be
97
disclaimed.” The applicant sought reversal of the TTAB’s decision
on two grounds: (1) the TTAB failed to identify the products and
services offered under applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark
that STEREOTAXIS merely described, and (2) there was insufficient
evidence to establish that STEREOTAXIS is descriptive of any of the
products and services bearing applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design
98
mark.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the applicant’s first ground for
appeal, namely, that the TTAB was required to identify the particular
99
products and services that STEREOTAXIS merely described. The
court stated:
[T]he Trademark Office may require a disclaimer as a condition of
registration if the mark is merely descriptive for at least one of the
products or services involved. We know of no requirement in the
trademark statute or elsewhere that the Board must make the
additional analysis the [a]pplicant seeks in order to determine that
a proposed mark is merely descriptive as applied to the
100
[a]pplicant’s products and services.

The court further disagreed with the applicant’s argument that
there was insufficient evidence to support the TTAB’s finding that
STEREOTAXIS was merely descriptive of the goods and services
101
bearing applicant’s STEREOTAXIS and Design mark.
The court
stressed that the TTAB’s determination of mere descriptiveness is a
factual finding that will be upheld unless unsupported by substantial
102
evidence.
Here, the evidence relied on by the TTAB consisted of
103
104
dictionary definitions and press releases.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 1040-41.
Id. at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1041-42.
The court noted that the TTAB found support from the ENCARTA WORLD
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The applicant argued that the TTAB should have limited its
definition of STEREOTAXIS to “products and services that utilize an
external reference frame, a computer and a scanning device, which
105
the [a]pplicant’s products do not use.”
The applicant further
contended that other definitions exist “that are more reflective of the
106
The Federal
purchasing public’s understanding of the term.”
Circuit disagreed and determined that substantial evidence
107
supported the TTAB’s finding. The court stated that the applicant
did not “show that an external reference frame, a computer and a
scanning device are essential elements, rather than simply a common
108
methodology, of stereotaxis.” The court further stated that in order
for the applicant to succeed on its argument, it would have to “show
that its proposed definition would be understood by the relevant
public—here the medical profession—to be the only meaning of the
109
term.”
The court concluded that because the applicant failed to
establish the foregoing “the fact that the [a]pplicant’s products may
use magnets and magnetic imagery rather than an external frame of
reference and computer generated imagery is not enough to invalidate
the finding that the [a]pplicant’s proposed use of the term
110
‘stereotaxis’ is merely descriptive of its products and services.”
This case stands for three propositions: (1) neither an examining
attorney nor the TTAB is required to specify which good or service a
proposed mark merely describes, but rather it is sufficient to find that
the proposed mark is merely descriptive of one of the products or
services; (2) the fact that evidence exists to support a different
classification of a mark is insufficient, but instead an applicant must
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1753 (1st ed. 1999) which defines “stereotaxis” as a “‘technique
in brain surgery: neurological surgery involving the insertion of delicate instruments
that are guided to a specific area by the use of three-dimensional scanning
techniques.’” The court further referenced MedTerms.com, an online medical
dictionary that defines “stereotaxis” as the “‘use of a computer and scanning devices
to create three-dimensional pictures.’” In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at 1042 (citing
MEDTERMS MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://www.medterms.com (last visited Mar. 12,
2006)).
104. The TTAB found further support from a press release by Advent
International which the court determined adequately demonstrated the public’s
perception of the applicant’s products and services. In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at
1042.
105. Id.
106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. The court further stated that the issue before it was not whether evidence
existed to support a finding that the proposed mark could be classified differently,
but rather whether substantial evidence supported the TTAB’s decision. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813
(C.C.P.A. 1978)).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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demonstrate that the TTAB’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence; and (3) a good or service can vary from the definition(s)
relied upon by the TTAB for the finding that a proposed mark is
merely descriptive provided the relevant public does not believe the
precise definition is the only meaning of the term.
C. Genericness, Mere Descriptiveness, and Secondary Meaning
In 2005, the Federal Circuit issued one precedential opinion and
two nonprecedential opinions concerning trademark genericness. In
111
In re STEELBUILDING.COM, the TTAB affirmed the PTO’s refusal
112
to register the claimed mark STEELBUILDING.COM. The Board’s
affirmance was based on an alternative determination that the mark
113
The Federal Circuit
was either generic or merely descriptive.
vacated the finding of genericness, but affirmed the refusal on the
114
grounds of mere descriptiveness and lack of secondary meaning.
The court articulated the two-part genericness inquiry as first
determining the genus of goods or services and then determining
whether the term sought to be registered was understood by the
115
relevant public to refer primarily to such genus of goods or services.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by attacking the genus used in
116
the Board’s decision.
The court’s starting point for its attack was the subtle, yet critical
difference between how the applicant described the goods and
services bearing its mark and how the Board described the applicant’s
117
goods and services.
Specifically, the applicant described its goods
and services as “computerized on-line retail services in the field of
118
pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems,” while the
Board described applicant’s goods and services as being “the sale of
119
pre-engineered steel buildings on the Internet.”
While the two descriptions seem similar in meaning, the
description used by the Board failed to account for the fact that
120
STEELBUILDING.COM provided more than sales. Specifically, the
applicant’s Website provided highly interactive options that allowed
the customer to create unique designs and then obtain pricing
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1297-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1298.
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information for the designs.
Therefore, the Website was much
122
more than a mere shopping guide. The Board’s misunderstanding
of the proper genus would have been an adequate ground for the
123
Federal Circuit to vacate the Board’s genericness decision.
Finally, the court addressed the significance of attaching .COM to a
mark, finding that it was no different than attaching a word such as
124
“company” or “incorporated.”
Following precedent, the court
rejected the Board’s position that the addition of a top-level domain
indicator could never render a term sufficiently distinctive for
125
registration. In In re STEELBUILDING.COM, the court determined
that the addition of .COM expanded the meaning of the mark to
include Internet services that enabled individual design of steel
126
structures.
Notwithstanding
the
court’s
determination
that
STEELBUILDING.COM was not generic, the court nonetheless
upheld the TTAB decision on the grounds that the mark was
127
descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning.
For
descriptiveness purposes, STEELBUILDING would convey the same
impression as “steel buildings;” and since the addition of .COM only
implied that the services would be associated with online commerce,
128
it did not alter the descriptive character of the mark.
In the secondary meaning analysis, the court dismissed a large
129
portion of the evidence provided by the applicant.
The court
dismissed evidence of Internet advertising because the applicant did
130
not spend enough money.
The court dismissed evidence relating
131
to an Internet poll because it lacked sufficient reliability. The court
also reviewed additional, unspecified evidence presented to the
Board, but determined that “none of that evidence established the
132
proposed mark’s distinctiveness.”
In partial dissent, Circuit Judge Richard Linn disagreed with the
treatment of the evidence of secondary meaning provided by the
133
applicant.
Specifically, he felt that distinctiveness “attributable to
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1301 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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domain name recognition” should not have been discounted because
134
“domain name recognition is a form of source identification . . . .”
He considered it legal error to discount distinctiveness evidence on
135
the simple basis that the mark was also a domain name.
Additionally, Judge Linn disagreed with the discounting of
applicant’s Internet advertising evidence, particularly when the case
relied on for dismissing the evidence was a 1994 case decided before
136
Internet advertising became a viable strategy. The applicant’s sales
137
had risen from $500,000 to $4,500,000 in seven months. Thus, even
though the actual money spent on advertising may have been modest,
the effect may have been powerful enough to create secondary
138
meaning.
Months prior to the Federal Circuit’s precedential decision in In re
STEELBUILDING.COM, the court issued a nonprecedential opinion
affirming the TTAB’s decision sustaining the Examining Attorney’s
refusal to register as merely descriptive the claimed mark TICK TAPE
for a “hand tool for removing insects attached to human or animal
139
hosts.”
In In re Innovation Development Group, Inc., the Examining
Attorney requested a copy of the applicant’s published patent and
used the language describing the device against the applicant and in
140
support of the mere descriptiveness finding.
In support of its position that TICK TAPE was suggestive and not
descriptive, the applicant argued that the Board failed to identify any
components of its tool that could be described as “tape,” nor could it,
141
because tape is flexible and its tool is rigid.
The applicant also
argued that not all adhesive products are considered “tape,” and
there are many different types of tape, including magnetic tape, so
using the term “tape” does not necessarily mean the product has
142
adhesive qualities.
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. It
agreed with the Solicitor that “substantial evidence supports the
143
Board’s findings that TICK TAPE is merely descriptive.”
In
particular, the court noted the Board’s finding that the term “tape”
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1302.
136. Id. at 1303.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In re Innovation Dev. Group, Inc., 126 F. App’x 471 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. The patent described the device as having “a foam backing with an adhesive
surface” that “will adhere to the body of the tick while the device is pulled away from
the skin, resulting in the removal of the tick.” Id. at 472 (quoting U.S. Patent No.
6,718,686 B2 (filed Feb. 13, 2002)).
141. Id. at 472-73.
142. Id. at 473.
143. Id.
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has a broad definition that includes “adhesive tape,” and relying on
the description set forth in the applicant’s published patent, the
court concluded that the applicant’s product “falls squarely within
the definition of ‘tick tape,’” such that the claimed “mark TICK TAPE
would immediately indicate that one component of [the] hand
tool . . . is particularly useful for removing ticks,” rendering the
144
designation merely descriptive.
145
In In re Precision Cuts, Inc., the applicant attempted to register a
146
stylized version of the mark PRECISION CUTS for hair cut services.
The trademark examiner determined, and the Board affirmed, that
the mark was generic and thus required a disclaimer of the words in
147
the mark.
On appeal, the court evaluated whether the Board’s
148
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The evidence at
issue in the case was the submission by the examiner of sixty
149
examples of “precision cut” returned by a NEXIS search.
150
The genericness inquiry requires a two-part analysis.
First, the
151
Second, it must be
genus of goods or services must be identified.
shown that the relevant public primarily associates the contested
152
mark with the genus of services for which it is to be used.
In this
153
Thus,
case, the genus was uncontested—it was “haircut services.”
the ultimate question was whether there was substantial evidence to
show that the public primarily associated “precision cuts” with haircut
154
services.
The court held that the NEXIS results constituted sufficient
evidence, stating that “[a] reasonable person’s credulity would be
satiated by the hundreds of NEXIS search returns that the examiner,
and the Board, relied upon to establish a prima facie case that the
155
terms are generic.” Additionally, the court noted that the PTO was
not required to administer consumer surveys to discharge its burden
156
under a genericness finding.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 473-74.
131 F. App’x 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291.
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D. Surname Refusals and The Paris Convention
The Federal Circuit also had occasion to address a surname refusal
157
while revisiting the subject of the Paris Convention
and its
158
159
In In re Rath, the
application to section 44 of the Lanham Act.
applicant appealed from a TTAB decision refusing registration of the
160
trademarks RATH and DR. RATH on the principal register.
The
TTAB refused registration on the ground that the marks were
161
ineligible under section 2(e) of the Lanham Act because they were
162
considered primarily the surname of the applicant.
Dr. Rath
advanced the argument that he was entitled to registration on the
grounds that he possessed a registration of the marks in his country
163
of origin.
Citing the Paris Convention, he argued that the surname rule was
at odds with the rights accorded to those holding foreign
164
registrations. Specifically, he argued that he should not be denied
registration unless his marks fell within one of the three enumerated
165
exceptions provided in Article 6 quinquies of the Paris Convention.
Because Article 6 quinquies did not explicitly except the registration
166
of surnames, he argued that his registration should be allowed.
In affirming the TTAB, the court first held that the Convention was
not a self-executing treaty; therefore, it was only binding to the extent
167
that it had been implemented by Congress.
Because Congress
adopted language providing for the registration for foreign marks “if
eligible,” the court determined that foreign marks must satisfy the
substantive section 2 requirements of the Lanham Act, including the
168
surname rule. The court found that the language of section 44(e)
of the Lanham Act clearly indicated that “if eligible” referred to the
requirements for registration on the principal register, rather than

157. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000) (governing international conventions and the
registration of foreign marks in the United States).
159. 402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
160. Id. at 1208.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000) (prohibiting the registration of a mark which is
“primarily merely a surname”).
162. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1208.
163. See id. (basing this claim on German trademarks for “nutritional
supplements, books, grains, and educational services”).
164. See id. at 1209 (conceding “that the marks are primarily, merely surnames”).
165. Id. (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra,
note 157).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1209-10.
168. Id. at 1211.
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the eligibility requirements of the Convention.
Thus, while
registration may have been required on the supplemental register,
the court held that no statute or treaty required that the registration
170
be on the principal register.
The court also revisited the holding of In re Establissements Darty et
171
Fils. In that case, a foreign registrant attempted to register a mark
172
in reliance on section 44(d) of the Lanham Act. The court found
that section 44(d) merely affected domestic priority and prior use
rules and excused certain foreign applicants from demonstrating use
173
in commerce to secure registration under the statute.
Section
44(d) did nothing to eliminate the substantive requirements for
registration on the principal register, i.e., the applicant was still
required to prove secondary meaning to make an otherwise
174
descriptive mark eligible for registration. Here, while section 44(e)
affected the prior use rules, it did nothing to alter the substantive
175
bars to registration.
In a concurring opinion, Judge William Bryson would have upheld
the decision on the narrower grounds that surnames were “merely
descriptive” marks and thus fell within the Convention exceptions as
176
marks “devoid of distinctive character.”
However, citing various
pieces of legislative history, he believed it was unlikely that the phrase
“if eligible” referred to the section 2 requirements of the Lanham
177
Act.
The majority undertook this opportunity to elaborate on the
interplay between the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act,
concluding that the Lanham Act did not require contemporaneous
178
interpretation of the Convention.
Meanwhile, the concurring
opinion argued that the Convention necessarily must be interpreted
for foreign registrations because the Lanham Act intended to
“‘provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions

169. Id.
170. Id. at 1211-12.
171. 759 F.2d 15 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
172. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1212. Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1126(d) (2000), governs applications by individuals who have previously filed an
application for registration of the mark in certain foreign countries to register marks
in the United States.
173. In re Rath, 402 F.3d at 1213.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1214.
176. Id. at 1220–21 (Bryson, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1213-14 (majority opinion).
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respecting trademarks . . . entered into between the United States
179
and foreign nations.’”
E. Gray Market Goods
180

In SKF USA, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision that section 337 of the Tariff Act
181
of 1930 was not violated by four companies’ importation of “gray
182
market” ball bearings originally manufactured by SKF but not
183
There were no physical
authorized for sale in the United States.
differences between SKF’s ball bearings authorized for American sale
and the foreign products; rather, the nature and extent of post-sale
184
technical and engineering services differed.
A customer who
purchased ball bearings from an “authorized” source would receive,
for example, access to experienced engineers for on-site consultation
185
or access via a “hotline.”
The importation of gray market goods violates the Lanham Act if
the gray market goods are “materially different” from the authorized
186
goods.
In this case, the Federal Circuit addressed an issue of first
187
impression —whether the distinction between domestic goods and
gray market goods must be physically manifested in the product or
188
packaging in order to be “materially different” and thus infringing.
The court affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding for the
first time that “material differences need not be physical in order to
189
establish trademark infringement in gray market cases.”
In
support, the Federal Circuit “[made] explicit what may only have
been implicit” in its holding in Gamut v. International Trading
190
Commission.
It noted that the Gamut court developed a “material
179. Id. at 1216 (Bryson, J., concurring) (quoting Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2000)).
180. 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
181. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). The section makes unlawful, among other things,
“[t]he importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within
the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles
that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the
Trademark Act of 1946.” Id. § 1337(a)(1)(C).
182. “Gray market” goods, sometimes called “gray goods,” are goods “‘legally
acquired abroad[, but] imported [into the United States] without the consent of
the . . . trademark holder.’” SKF USA Inc., 423 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Gamut Trading
Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
183. Id. at 1309, 1318.
184. Id. at 1309.
185. Id. at 1309-10.
186. Id. at 1313 (citing Gamut, 200 F.3d at 779).
187. Id. at 1312.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1314.
190. Id. at 1313. The court in Gamut announced a test under which a company
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differences” test, not a “physical differences” test for determining
191
whether gray goods infringed. Thus, the plain language of the test
demonstrated that a finding of infringement was not limited merely
to physical differences. Second, the Gamut court had relied upon
cases that held nonphysical material differences to be sufficient to
192
avoid trademark infringement.
Finally, the court noted that a
manufacturer’s goodwill might be invested in nonphysical traits, and
consumers may consider those traits to be a material difference, the
193
lack of which may be confusing.
After determining that nonphysical differences may be “material”
and subject a gray market importer to trademark infringement
liability, the court next discussed whether the four gray market
194
distributors infringed upon SKF’s marks in this case.
The
Commission found that there was no infringement because SKF did
not provide the post-sale technical and engineering support to “all or
195
substantially all” of its customers.
SKF argued that, to prove infringement, it should only have to
show that a sufficient number of its goods are materially different
from the gray goods, and that certain amounts of a trademark
owner’s nonconforming goods may be ignored if they are of de
196
The Federal Circuit disagreed. Relying on the
minimis amounts.
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Martin’s Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond &
197
Gem Trading USA, Co., the Federal Circuit held that
If less than all or substantially all of a trademark owner’s products
possess the material difference, then the trademark owner has
placed into the stream of commerce a substantial quantity of goods

may be liable for trademark infringement for importing gray goods when “there are
differences between the foreign and domestic product and [those] differences are
material.” 200 F.3d at 779. The Gamut court set a low threshold for materiality,
“requiring no more than showing that consumers would be likely to consider the
differences between the foreign and domestic products to be significant when
purchasing the product, for such differences would suffice to erode the goodwill of
the domestic source.” Id. For a more complete analysis of the Gamut holding, see
Stephen R. Baird, Review of the 1999 Trademark Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1374-76 (2000).
191. SKF USA Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
192. See id. at 1314 (stating that “the appropriate test should not be strictly limited
to physical differences”). The SKF USA court quoted the Gamut court for the
proposition that “[d]ifferences in labeling and other written materials have been
deemed material.” Id. (quoting Gamut, 200 F.3d at 781).
193. Id. at 1314.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1315.
196. Id. at 1311, 1316.
197. 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997).
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that are or may be the same or similar to those of the importer,
198
and then there is no material difference.

If the trademark owner sells a substantial amount of
nonconforming goods, the court reasoned, consumers would not be
199
confused by the gray goods. Allowing a trademark owner to recover
“when less than ‘substantially all’ of its goods bear the material
difference from the gray goods thus would allow the owner itself to
contribute to the confusion by consumers that it accuses gray market
200
importers of creating.” The court discounted SKF’s argument that
the sale of one nonconforming product may defeat an infringement
claim, emphasizing that “the ‘all or substantially all’ benchmark
201
recognizes something less than 100% compliance will suffice . . . .”
Finally, the court held that SKF could not meet the standard that
202
all or substantially all of its sales were conforming. The court noted
that “it was undisputed that 87.4 percent of [its] sales to authorized
distributors were supported by the ‘full panoply’ of post-sale technical
203
and engineering services.”
SKF’s sales through another business
unit, Chicago Rawhide, provided the services only on a discretionary
basis based on the size of the customer and the customer’s history,
and thus there was no guarantee that the customer would consistently
204
receive the post-sale services.
Consequently, the court refused to
205
count sales through the Chicago Rawhide division as conforming.
The court noted that SKF’s sales through “alternate channels of
distribution,” including sales to gray market distributors, surplus
distributors, and others further undercuts its claim that substantially
206
all of its goods sold were conforming.
The court rejected SKF’s
claim that the goods distributed in the “alternate channels” should be
discounted, stating that “[t]he material difference standard focuses
on differences in the goods themselves, not differences in their
channels of distribution or the consumer expectations in those
207
channels.” It therefore affirmed the ITC’s determination that SKF
did not establish a material difference between its own products and

198. SKF USA, 423 F.3d at 1315.
199. Id. at 1315.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1316.
202. Id. at 1317.
203. Id.
204. See id. (noting that the ITC excluded consumer expectations as a basis for its
decision).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1317-18 (reiterating SKF USA’s position that its services were
categorically superior to “any services that others could provide”).
207. Id. at 1318.
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those of the distributors based on post-sale technical and engineering
services and the ITC’s findings that there was no section 337 violation
208
by the importation of the gray market ball bearings.
The case stands for two important propositions. First, it is now
clear that differences in gray market goods do not have to be physical
differences or differences in accompanying safety stickers, labels, or
209
instruction manuals.
The differences may include any “material
difference” that a consumer would likely consider, including any
210
However, the Federal
services related to the sale of the product.
Circuit also made explicit that the mark owner cannot claim
infringement against a gray market importer when it itself is selling a
211
substantial quantity of nonconforming goods.
While the court set
no particular standard, it found in this case that SKF’s sales of 12.6%
212
of nonconforming goods defeated its claim.
Any producer who
wishes to protect its line from gray market sales must ensure that it
213
upholds its own product quality control.
F.

Trade Dress and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

The Federal Circuit possesses exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
patent cases decided by the federal district courts throughout the
214
United States.
Some patent cases include both patent claims and
trademark claims, especially trade dress claims under section 43(a) of
215
the Lanham Act.
Thus, in addition to reviewing trademark
decisions of the TTAB and the ITC, the Federal Circuit also reviews
trademark rulings from federal district court patent decisions.
216
Hartco Engineering, Inc. v. Wang’s International, Inc. is one such
case. In Hartco, the Federal Circuit reviewed a design patent decision

208. Id.
209. See id. at 1313 (noting that the court was “mak[ing] explicit what may have
only been implicit in Gamut”).
210. Id. at 1314.
211. Id. at 1315.
212. Id. at 1317-18.
213. However, a manufacturer’s sales of used or refurbished nonconforming
goods can still protect the integrity of its product line. See id. at 1318 (noting that
“consumers do not expect used or refurbished goods to be the same as new goods
and that for such goods, ‘material differences’ do not necessarily measure consumer
confusion” (quoting Nitro Leisure Prods. L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2003))).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2000) (providing that the “Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent
infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting”).
215. See, e.g., Hartco Eng’g, Inc. v. Wang’s Int’l, Inc., 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (evaluating claims involving patent and trade dress infringement).
216. 142 F. App’x 455 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, including a trade dress claim under section 43(a) of the
217
Lanham Act. At trial, the jury found that Wang’s willfully infringed
218
Hartco’s claimed trade dress in a hitch cover design and packaging
219
design. Hartco argued that the jury instructions erroneously failed
to require proof of secondary meaning for product configuration
220
trade dress and inherent distinctiveness for packaging trade dress.
Applying Fifth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court trade dress law and
writing for a unanimous three-member panel, Circuit Judge Sharon
Prost rejected Hartco’s argument that its hitchcover design is
221
inherently distinctive. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
222
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., the Federal Circuit confirmed
that “a product design cannot be inherently distinctive as a matter of
223
law.”
To determine whether Hartco had met its burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to support a finding of secondary
meaning, the court indicated that it must look to the “length and
nature of use, sales volume and advertising, consumer surveys and
224
testimony, and [the] appellant’s intent.”
Because the record
showed that Hartco did not introduce evidence of this type (other
than having sold its hitchcover design for four years before appellants
sold their competing four propeller hitchcover design), the court
concluded that “Hartco did not meet its burden of establishing
secondary meaning” and because “no reasonable jury could have
225
concluded that Hartco showed secondary meaning,” the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of “judgment of
noninfringement as a matter of law, together with the damage award
226
relevant to this claim.”

217. Id. at 456, 459.
218. The trade dress for the hitchcover design is described as a “novelty trailer
hitchcover featuring a three-blade marine propeller . . . that spins from the force of
moving air when attached to the trailer hitch of a vehicle.” Id. at 456.
219. Id. The Federal Circuit identified the claimed packaging trade dress as
consisting of five elements: (1) a clear plastic package showing the hitchcover
product inside, (2) blue cardboard background, (3) “white lettering identifying the
product and Hartco Engineering’s trademark ‘PROP’R-HITCHCOVER’”, (4) “red
lines in the upper left hand corner”, and (5) “a picture of the product in position on
a vehicle and the product’s patent information in the upper right hand corner.” Id.
at 461.
220. Id. at 458.
221. Id. at 460.
222. 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
223. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at 460.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 460-61.
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With respect to Hartco’s product packaging trade dress claim, the
Federal Circuit confirmed that “[u]nlike product configuration,
product packaging is capable of being inherently distinctive and thus
a showing of secondary meaning may be unnecessary to prevail on a
227
trade dress claim.”
Although the court recognized that separately
the packaging elements may not be subject to protection, “taken
together, Hartco’s trade dress is ipso facto inherently distinctive and
228
thus, subject to protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”
With respect to the question of packaging trade dress infringement
because Hartco presented evidence of trade dress similarity,
interchangeability of products, common purchasers and advertisers,
actual confusion among consumers, and showed that Wang’s
intended to copy Hartco’s packaging, the court found that the jury
verdict was supported by substantial evidence that there was a
229
likelihood of confusion.
As a result, the portion of the decision
concerning damages was vacated for further proceedings to
determine the appropriate damages for the successful packaging
230
trade dress infringement claim.
In 2005, Circuit Judge Sharon Prost wrote another trade dress
opinion interpreting section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, this time
231
applying Ninth Circuit trade dress law. In Decorations for Generations,
232
Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that
substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict in favor of the
manufacturer’s trade dress and unfair competition claims concerning
233
a steel Christmas tree stand and reversed the district court’s denial
227. Id. at 461.
228. Id.
This portion of the decision seems rather generous to Hartco
Engineering and a bit weak in reasoning. Without citation, the court held that
“[p]ackaging trade dress is inherently distinctive if its intrinsic nature identifies the
source of the product.” Id. at 461. Even more significantly, the Federal Circuit made
no mention of what substantial evidence the jury could have relied upon to support a
necessary finding of inherent distinctiveness in packaging having a clear plastic case
to view the enclosed product, a blue cardboard backing with a picture of the
hitchcover in use on the upper right hand corner, and the product brand positioned
on the upper left hand corner. Indeed, it is not self-evident, at least to this author,
that the intrinsic nature and positioning of these combined elements automatically
identifies the source of the product. Equally significantly, the court also made no
mention of whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the
threshold question of whether the elements claimed in the alleged trade dress were
nonfunctional, a requirement that has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000), as well as the Fifth
Circuit in Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1350 (5th Cir. 1994).
229. Hartco, 142 F. App’x at 460.
230. Id.
231. Decorations for Generations, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 128 F. App’x
133 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
232. Id.
233. The Christmas tree stand design was described as
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of the defendant retailer’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
234
Applying Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court trade dress
verdict.
precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the record did not
contain substantial evidence in support of the manufacturer’s claim
of secondary meaning in the alleged product configuration trade
235
dress.
The district court had found that “substantial evidence” supported
a finding that the following secondary meaning factors had been
established by the Christmas tree stand manufacturer: (1) length of
time and exclusivity of use, (2) intentional copying, and (3) evidence
236
of actual confusion.
Based on the Federal Circuit’s review of the
record, it only agreed that substantial evidence supported the finding
concerning the length of time and exclusivity of use of the Christmas
237
tree stand design. It maintained that sales for six consecutive years
of roughly the same design “is a sufficient amount of time, year after
year, to support a jury finding” on this factor, even though the
seasonal nature of the product made it available and on display only
238
five to six weeks each year.
In rejecting the trial court’s finding of substantial evidence to
support the “intentional copying” element of the Ninth Circuit’s
secondary meaning test for protectable trade dress, the Federal
Circuit held: “While there was evidence introduced that supported
the conclusion that the defendants had indeed copied utilitarian
features of [the manufacturer’s] tree stand, there was no evidence
introduced that the defendants intentionally copied protected trade
dress that had been perceived by consumers as originating from a

[A] one-foot steel pipe (intended to contain the tree base), a six–inch square
plate of flat steel (that serves as a base), and four legs protruding from the
corners of the base and made of 24-inch long steel bars. The stand also
includes four screws that are meant to secure the tree by fitting into
apertures that are evenly spaced around the steel pipe component. In order
to evoke Christmas colors, [the] stand was colored green and red, with the
base and body of the stand colored green and the rim of the stand covered
by a red plastic covering.
Id. at 134. Although these elements seem to cry out for being labeled as “functional,”
and although a finding of nonfunctionality is a threshold question for determining
trade dress protection, the Federal Circuit “decline[d] to address whether substantial
evidence supported the jury’s finding that certain aspects of the tree stand are nonfunctional,” since it already had determined that “substantial evidence does not
support the jury’s finding that the . . . tree stand had established secondary meaning
in the minds of consumers . . . .” Id. at 139 n.6.
234. Id. at 134.
235. Id. at 136, 139.
236. Id. at 137.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 137-38.
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239

particular manufacturer.”
Finally, in rejecting the trial court’s
finding of substantial evidence to support the “actual confusion”
element of the secondary meaning test, the Federal Circuit noted
that the only evidence of so-called actual confusion in the record
stemmed from confusion among employees of the parties, not
240
Because the Federal Circuit was
consumers of the tree stand.
“aware of no precedent in the Ninth Circuit that would allow the
confusion of ‘the relevant buying public’ to be inferred by testimony
from company employees or associates,” it disagreed with the district
court that substantial evidence supported the finding of actual
241
confusion to support secondary meaning.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was not as prolific in 2005 as compared to past
years in issuing trademark opinions. The court chose to issue
precedential trademark decisions in only six cases. Only one of the
cases—the SKF USA decision concerning gray market goods—was
identified by the court as involving an issue of first impression,
namely, whether the difference between domestic goods and gray
market goods must be physically manifested in the product or
packaging in order to qualify as “materially different” and thus
infringing. While none of the 2005 Federal Circuit trademark cases
can fairly be described as groundbreaking, they do advance the
court’s growing and important body of trademark law.

239. Id. at 138. Indeed, the Federal Circuit specifically found “that the copied
elements of [the] tree stand that were identified as being non-functional by the
district court (i.e., the colors, the plastic rim, and the display box) were, in fact,
utilitarian in nature.” Id.
240. Id. at 138-39.
241. Id. at 139.

